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EUROPE IN CRISIS:  







Europe has been battered by the global financial and economic crisis, 
which has turned into a sovereign debt crisis that is not only threatening 
the Economic and Monetary Union and the common currency of the 17 
countries of the euro zone, but the whole European integration process. In 
this immediate climate of crisis, requiring ever-greater political and 
economic sacrifices to keep all countries within the euro zone, too little 
attention is being paid to the long-term challenges Europe faces. 
Europe is facing a daunting set of challenges, which will require 
significant reforms to maintain Europe's economic and social model. 
Dealing with climate change, population ageing, increasing inequality, 
rising unemployment, resource scarcity and global competition will 
require a deeply rooted change in how Europeans live. Furthermore, these 
challenges are being aggravated by the crisis, and the sovereign debt crisis 
will limit what public money can do in future years. Europe will need to 
get used to a very different world, which is characterised by trade-offs and 
sacrifices. 
2. Is the European model special? 
To assess the threat posed by these long-term challenges, including the 
long-term impacts of the current crisis, we first have to determine what 
makes Europe special. What makes the European model uniquely 
European? 
The first and striking issue that can be observed is, of course, that there 
is significant diversity. Even on a very broad macroeconomic level, many 
have classified Europe's economies and social systems into different 
categories, for example, into a Nordic, a Continental, an Anglo-Saxon and 
a Mediterranean model, all with separate characteristics (Sapir 2006). The 
accession of the formerly centrally planned Central and Eastern European 
Fabian Zuleeg 7 
countries has, if anything, made the diversity even wider1, also adding 
countries with significantly lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita than in the previous European Union (EU). 
However, even this broad categorisation can easily be called into 
question. For example, where do countries such as France, which arguably 
share some aspects of both the Mediterranean and the Continental model, 
belong? Do all Nordic countries share a similar economic policy 
approach? The euro crisis has also shown that rather than increasing 
convergence, which arguably was the case in the pre-crisis period for 
countries such as Poland, Ireland and Spain, we are facing a period of 
fragmentation, with some countries falling further and further behind. 
Looking at this evidence of continuing diversity and divergence, it 
could be concluded that there is no such thing as a European model. There 
are, however, clear indications that such a European model exists. This is 
more apparent when looking at the situation from the outside and in 
comparison to the rest of the world. 
A case in point is the size and role of government. Typically, the 
European model entails a larger government sector with comparatively 
high public spending. Government expenditure stood at 49.1% in the 
EU-27 in 2011 (Wahrig and Gancedo Vallina 2012), compared to the 
OECD average total outlays of 43.2% (OECD 2012). This level does not 
necessarily mean high public deficits: some countries with the highest 
levels of public spending have sound public finances, while other countries 
with low public spending have significant deficit problems. 
There are typically two reasons for the high level of public spending: a 
relatively generous social net (social security) and the provision of 
universal public services (for example, health and education). This pattern 
of public spending reflects the values of Europeans: while there is a belief 
in the basic principle of a capitalist market economy, there is also a strong 
notion that the “US-style” free market capitalism has to be tempered by 
the state. In essence, the preference of Europeans is for what is termed the 
“social market economy” or the “welfare state.” In recent decades, 
Europeans' concern for social issues has been complemented by a strong 
emphasis on environmental concerns, including combating climate 
change. 
The European model is thus closely aligned with the concept of 
sustainable development, with economic growth complemented by social 
and environmental protection. This concept is reflected in the debate at the 
European level about whether Europeans need and should forego a certain 
                                                          
1 Beáta Farkas (2011) argues that there is a separate model for Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
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level of economic growth to maintain high levels of environmental 
protection (by reducing resource consumption) and social cohesion (by 
reducing incentives for profit-making through redistribution). This, in part, 
reflects the high standard of living that has already been reached across the 
EU. However, we should also note that for those countries where incomes 
are lower, more emphasis is generally put on economic growth and 
competition between individuals as an important driver for the economy. 
The general concern for sustainable development is integrated into 
policy at the European level, which in turn reinforces a pan-European 
model. By emphasising the protection of the environment and of workers, 
the EU has created a pan-European standard, which in turn defines 
Europe's unique economic, social and environmental model. Because 
accession to the EU requires acceptance of the existing legal framework 
(the acquis communautaire), the EU also effectively transfers these values 
to new members. 
3. Europe's long-term challenges 
Over recent decades, the Member States of the EU have increasingly 
felt their economic, social and environmental model to be under threat by 
a range of global and European long-term challenges. 
3.1. Globalisation 
One of the key challenges arises from Europe's apparent ambivalence 
to the globalisation process. Europe is clearly one of the key beneficiaries 
of globalisation: European economies are among the world's greatest 
traders and have managed to raise their standards of living significantly 
through integration into the global economy.2 
However, in recent years, for many Europeans the threats from 
globalisation have come more to the forefront, be it culturally, through the 
movement of people, or through intensified competition. Increasingly, 
there is a perception that Europe is not keeping up with its key 
competitors: neither with the more developed economies, such as the US, 
that manage to outpace European productivity developments through 
innovation and entrepreneurship, nor with the developing countries that 
have far lower wages. In both cases, the fear persists that higher European 
                                                          
2 See for example the argument made by José Manuel Durão Barroso (2008), 
President of the European Commission, referring to Daniel Hamilton and Joseph 
Quinlan’s book “Globalization and Europe: Prospering in the New Whirled 
Order”. 
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taxes, as well as higher social and environmental standards, reduce the 
ability of Europeans to compete. 
While this argument has to be taken with a large pinch of salt – after 
all, many European countries have competed very effectively for a long 
time, and the overall European trade position is close to balance – this 
poses a significant challenge to Europe's approach to globalisation.  
First, global competition emphasises the need for quality of public 
spending. If public spending is simply an additional cost, the EU is 
unlikely to retain its competitive edge. If the spending helps to increase 
Europe's productivity and economic capacity, for example by increasing 
human capital and necessary infrastructure, it can add to the overall 
performance of an economy. 
Second, there is a significant challenge for low-skilled jobs that can be 
outsourced to emerging economies. This threat is not for low-skilled jobs 
per se – there are many jobs that are difficult to outsource, for example in 
the area of personal care. However, in sectors where it is easy to transport 
the final product, such as basic manufacturing, labour-intensive industries 
tend to migrate to lower wage cost countries. This can create persistent 
long-term unemployment, especially for low-skilled workers. 
Third, globalisation and especially global competition can put intense 
pressure on companies to consider their cost basis carefully, potentially 
relocating or investing in countries with lower taxes, reduced environmental 
and social standards, or a faster growing market. Companies that do not 
adjust to the reality of global competition will eventually have to close 
down.  
Together, this adds up to a significant challenge to Europe's economic 
and social model. Economies characterised by high public spending without 
the resulting increase in productive capacity, long-term unemployment 
problems, a complex and bureaucratic business environment and low 
investment will struggle to maintain their highly valued lifestyles. While 
some European economies can concurrently maintain their economic and 
social model and retain their competitiveness, others struggle.3 
3.2. Resource competition 
Globalisation is also aggravating the global resource challenge. 
Economic progress still relies on increased consumption of natural 
                                                          
3 In the global competitiveness index, Northern and Western European countries 
dominate the top 10 with Sweden (3rd), Finland (4th), Germany (6th), the 
Netherlands (7th), Denmark (8th) and the United Kingdom (10th). In contrast 
France is only 18th, and Greece is down to 90th (World Economic Forum 2012). 
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resources. The increased demand from the growing middle classes in 
countries such as India and China is creating a strong upward pressure on 
prices for all resources. While the economic crisis is, to some extent, 
reducing demand and thus the upward pressure on prices, this relief is only 
temporary. 
This upward pressure on resources will most obviously affect energy, 
in particular oil, but will also affect energy sources such as coal that were 
less affected in the past. The types of price spikes observed just prior to the 
crisis, which were intensified by conflict, are likely to recur. This then 
affects all of the economy because input prices are higher, leading to 
inflation and lower growth, but also higher food prices. This development 
is mirrored by other resources, such as minerals, commodities or rare 
earths. In particular parts of the world, there will also be an increasing 
pressure on water resources. 
For the EU countries, this resource competition will limit the growth 
potential and increase inflationary pressure. Given that growth rates are 
significantly lower than in emerging economies, the EU provides fewer 
economic opportunities, which will make it increasingly difficult to access 
the resources that are needed. While it is undoubtedly true that emerging 
and developing economies will be even more affected, this provides little 
comfort for the EU. 
In addition to physical resources, there will be intensive competition 
for human resources, especially in relation to scarce, superior and soft 
skills (Collett and Zuleeg 2008). To attract these types of skills in the 
future, European countries can no longer rely on passively attracting 
immigrants and filtering out those that are considered desirable. Rather, 
European countries will have to actively compete for these migrants. 
3.3. Increasing inequality and rising unemployment 
Migration and the increasing diversity of Europe's societies have 
undoubtedly contributed to Europe's economic success in the post-
World War II period. However, increasing diversity has also created 
longer-term issues that are difficult to resolve. In particular, the integration 
of some of the migrant communities has proven difficult, with many 
children from migrant backgrounds underperforming in education and, 
subsequently, being insufficiently integrated into the labour market. This 
deficiency perpetuates social integration problems for these communities.  
However, the problem of inequality does not only affect migrant 
communities. While recent decades have led to an increase in living 
standards for many, there has also been a persistence of disadvantage for 
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some groups. The impact of globalisation noted above can make it difficult 
to reintegrate the long-term unemployed into the labour market, frequently 
resulting in low aspirations being transmitted to future generations. In 
recent years, inequalities in Europe have been rising, a problem likely to 
be aggravated by the economic crisis (European Trade Union Institute 
2012). 
There is an on-going debate in Europe regarding how far inequality 
affects economic performance and imposes costs on all of society.4 
However, having groups in society that are permanently excluded clearly 
adds a burden to social protection systems. And given Europe's 
demographic profile, Europe cannot afford the long-term costs associated 
with under-utilised human resources. 
3.4. Demographic change 
Demographic change, in particular the combination of low fertility and 
increasing life expectancy, will have a profound impact on European 
societies. While the demographic projections differ significantly between 
countries, the common feature for European countries will be population 
ageing: “Population ageing is undoubtedly going to be a key demographic 
challenge in many European countries over the next fifty years” 
(Lanzieri 2011). This development will have a transformative impact on 
European society, which is hard to appreciate in its entirety. 
Of course, migration can have a mitigating impact. However, the scale 
of migration that would be needed to reverse population ageing is very 
high: “In order to prevent a decline in the working-age population, the 
annual number of migrants would need to nearly double compared to 
recent experience” (UN 2001). In any case, it would only be a temporary 
fix because migrant populations also tend to age at similar rates once 
integrated. 
There are clearly challenges from population ageing that affect the 
welfare state. There is increasing pressure on health, care and pension 
systems, while, at the same time, the ratio of those paying into the public 
system to those receiving support is reduced. The obvious way to address 
this issue is by altering public support systems, for example by increasing 
the retirement age. However, this in and of itself is not enough, even if it 
was widely accepted as a step in the right direction. It is crucial to ensure 
that changes to entitlement increase the propensity of individuals to stay in 
the labour market; for example, apart from a potentially small reduction in 
                                                          
4 With significant debate triggered by the publication of Wilkinson and Pickett 
(2009). 
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public support costs, there is no gain if people, instead of retiring, become 
unemployed.  
Keeping all groups engaged in the labour market (i.e., the elderly but 
also other groups with a tendency to drop out, such as those with caring 
responsibilities, a migration background or with health problems) is the 
key to addressing the impact of population ageing.5 
Higher labour market participation also addresses the challenge of 
growth: an ageing population would automatically reduce the growth rate 
unless counteracted by such a development. But achieving higher labour 
market participation is a significant challenge, especially in light of the 
difficult labour market situation across Europe with unsustainably high 
unemployment in many countries. Once again, the current crisis is 
aggravating the long-term challenges Europe faces. 
3.5. Climate change 
One final challenge Europe faces is truly global in nature: how to 
mitigate climate change and how to limit global temperature increases. 
The challenge of dealing with climate change is, however, qualitatively 
different from the other challenges noted above, which makes finding a 
policy solution even more difficult. 
Why is climate change different? The key reason is that whatever 
Europe does with regard to its own emissions will have little impact on the 
overall picture. The growth in the emission of greenhouse gases takes 
place clearly outside of Europe, with the biggest increases in countries 
such as China. While higher emissions in these countries are driven by an 
understandable desire to create economic growth in emerging economies, 
it does aggravate the climate change challenge: even a reduction of 
emissions in Europe is quickly outweighed by developments elsewhere. In 
addition, the other major historical perpetrator of emissions, the US, is 
showing little leadership or motivation on this issue. 
These issues lead some to conclude that Europe should give up on 
attempting to combat climate change and just adapt to its effects while 
ignoring our global responsibilities. However, this is a very negative 
agenda with the obvious drawback that it could result in the destruction of 
the global climate system. A more positive approach is to develop Europe 
as a positive example of how environmental sustainability can be 
combined or even drive economic growth. Such a green growth scenario 
                                                          
5 The European Policy Centre (EPC) has developed the Labour Market Adjusted 
Dependency Ration which clearly shows the combined impact of labour market 
participation rates and ageing populations (Guerzoni and Zuleeg 2011). 
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might well become the standard that other countries aspire to, but it is 
difficult to implement. It is a slow process because of significant political 
and economic transition costs, and it has yet to receive the genuine 
backing of member states. And once again, the crisis is also hindering this 
process, with many arguing that now is not the right time to be too 
ambitious and that we should rather focus on jobs, even if this means that 
the long-term transformation is delayed. 
4. The crisis: from bad to worse 
The economic and financial crisis, which has battered Europe over the 
last three years or so, has aggravated these long-term challenges and has 
added some new and pressing issues that need to be tackled, not least the 
unsustainable public debt situation in many European countries. The crisis 
should thus not be understood as a cyclical downturn from which Europe 
will emerge unscathed. Rather, it is a deep-seated structural crisis that will 
profoundly threaten Europe's economic and social model. While the 
overall impact will crucially depend on how policy reacts to the crisis, it is 
already clear that the on-going transformation will impose significant 
transition costs on all of Europe. 
The first issue the EU will have to address is the aggregated growth 
crisis. The long-term challenges noted above have already tended to 
reduce Europe's growth rate. While policy can do much to reduce this 
impact, overall it remains a challenge to have strongly growing economies 
when faced with low-cost global competition and an ageing workforce. 
The unsustainable public debt situation in many countries further 
aggravates the situation: fiscal consolidation implies lower government 
spending, which will tend to reduce growth rates. 
Dealing with Europe's aggregated growth crisis is tricky at the best of 
times. Even before the economic crisis hit, European attempts to 
reinvigorate the EU economy were less than convincing. At first, European 
worries were raised by competition from the US, driven by impressive 
increases in productivity, and, subsequently, by competition from the 
emerging economies, led by China. The Europeans responded with a 
European growth strategy, the Lisbon strategy, aiming to generate growth 
and jobs in Europe. However, despite some revisions over time, the 
strategy lacked decisive implementation tools. Consequently, while some 
countries in Europe made great advances, others continued to lag behind. 
Even before the crisis hit, it was clear that the Lisbon agenda had not 
significantly shifted the EU's growth performance. 
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The revised version of the Lisbon strategy, Europe 2020, contains 
some provisions that will, in principle, drive implementation more 
strongly, including, for example, provisions to link any European money 
to the strategic objectives in Europe 2020. There are also moves to 
develop the single market further, for example by creating a digital single 
market for Europe's citizens. There are also some attempts to address the 
impact of the crisis, for example by making credit or alternative financial 
instruments more widely available. While these are important initiatives, 
which, if implemented,6 can have an impact on Europe's long-term growth 
rate, they are in themselves insufficient. 
5. Divergence, not convergence 
The solutions for the aggregated growth crisis also have the potential 
to aggravate Europe's other growth crisis: the increasing gap between the 
good performers and those lagging behind. The measures noted above, 
such as a better functioning single market, tend to benefit most those 
countries that have an economy geared towards trade. In a world of scarce 
and expensive capital, investments will go to the countries that are 
performing better. 
In the pre-crisis environment, it looked easier: private capital would 
flow to the peripheral countries, often generated by high savings rates in 
countries such as Germany, and public spending could be financed 
cheaply. Now, however, neither of these routes is open to the countries in 
crisis. Global investors will avoid crisis countries, not least because of the 
political and economic uncertainty such a crisis brings. In the current 
climate, the risks outweigh the possibilities of making returns. The reality 
is that crisis countries will need to receive support from those performing 
better. True, there is already significant funding being provided to prop up 
banking systems and to help governments that struggle to finance their 
public debt at reasonable rates. However, the crisis countries will also need 
support to encourage private investment and enable public investment, for 
example in education (Zuleeg and Emmanouilidis 2011). 
The need of the crisis countries for investment and growth also needs 
to be reflected in the reform programmes the crisis countries have to 
implement. One of the great paradoxes of the crisis is that fiscal 
consolidation tends to reduce growth, but without growth, fiscal 
consolidation becomes near impossible. Europe's approach to dealing with 
                                                          
6 The EPC’s (2012) Digital Single Market project estimates that completing only 
this aspect of the Single market would add at least 4% to EU GDP by 2020. 
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the euro crisis in the absence of positive external growth impulses is thus 
doomed to failure: not only is the fiscal consolidation not working, the 
political constituency for further reform is continually weakened. In the 
medium term, many electorates will question the purpose of reform: is it to 
help the weaker economies to improve, or is it just a means to preserve the 
euro? In either case, the perceived pain of reform is likely to outweigh the 
benefits. 
The recent summit in Brussels made some moves in the right 
direction7, for example by redirecting unused structural funds to the crisis 
countries and by enabling the European Investment Bank (EIB) to expand 
its lending operations. However, overcoming the growth divergence 
between the better performing countries and those in crisis will require 
significantly more action, for example by developing new financing 
mechanisms, providing guarantees for private sector investments and by 
redesigning the European budget (Zuleeg 2012). 
There is, however, little apparent appetite in Brussels for continuing in 
this course of action. Providing the current help for the crisis countries is 
already observed as stretching what citizens can bear. There is also 
concern about the potential moral hazard involved. If the crisis countries 
receive this support, will they not just fall back into bad habits? Many also 
note that the countries most affected by the euro crisis are not the only 
ones that need support. Countries outside the euro zone are also suffering, 
and the Central and Eastern European accession countries are still 
relatively poor when compared to the EU average GDP. 
6. Prospects: stagnation and imbalances? 
Europe's long-term challenges, together with the impact of the crisis, 
are putting European countries in a very difficult situation. It can be 
argued that Europe is facing a “perfect storm” with all the negative 
impacts reinforcing each other, potentially destroying EU citizens' faith in 
their trusted system and, thus, potentially destabilising Europe's economic 
and social model and the European integration process. If no sustainable 
solutions can be found for the challenges arising from globalisation, 
population ageing, resource scarcity, rising inequalities and climate 
change, and if the aggregated growth crisis and the divergence of the crisis 
countries from the better performing ones continue, it is difficult to see 
how Europe could emerge from its current economic doldrums. 
                                                          
7 See European Council (2012) which introduced a “Compact for Growth and 
Jobs.” 
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Europe might then be facing a situation similar to Japan, with a long-
term decline. This does not necessarily imply a dramatic collapse, but the 
European economy would lose dynamism and be left behind. In the longer 
term, this would also mean falling standards of living and a state that can 
no longer play the role of providing public services and social protection 
for all. 
However, the situation in Europe could turn out even worse, given 
Europe's complexity. Europe is not one country, but 27 (soon 28), with 
very different prospects and needs. A sluggish European economy also 
means that the catch-up process for the Central and Eastern Europeans 
would significantly slow down. There would be increasing imbalances 
within the euro zone. Some countries would try to shield their social 
market economy from the turmoil elsewhere, for example by limiting free 
movement of people, while others would struggle to provide even the most 
basic services. All in all, this does not look like a situation that would be to 
the benefit of Europe's citizens: disintegration and perpetual crisis. Indeed, 
the core fabric of the European model would be threatened. 
So what can be done? Policy can still have a decisive role to play if it 
can activate Europe's assets. However, this cannot be accomplished with 
traditional policy approaches. Adapting to the long-term challenges and 
the crisis will require systemic change. To rescue Europe's economic, 
social and environmental model – the very essence of the European 
project – it will not only need to be altered but also reinvented. Only if 
public services are an asset to economic growth, for example by 
effectively activating all those outside the labour market, can the system 
become truly sustainable. Europe's economic and social model must be a 
competitive factor in our relations with the rest of the world, helping us to 
develop new growth and employment patterns and attracting the best talent 
from across the world. If this crisis is to be taken as an opportunity for 
fundamental reform, it might well lead to the eventual re-emergence of 
European strength. 
This vision relies on an ability to carry it out. However, many countries 
in Europe have already lost this freedom of movement, or they never had 
the resources in the first place. So transforming Europe's economic, social 
and environmental model depends on joint EU action. Individual countries 
can do a great deal, but the high degree of interdependence and the need to 
show solidarity with those who do not have the means to carry out this 
process makes a pan-European approach a necessity. The crisis also 
aggravates the following need: solving the euro crisis must be an essential 
part of the way forward and can only be accomplished by moving forward 
together, towards a 'more Europe' solution. 
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Such fundamental change in Europe cannot happen without engaging 
Europe's citizens. We are no longer talking about some institutional change 
at the European level, which citizens hardly care about and are even less 
likely to understand. We are talking about the whole direction of the 
European integration process, and we are talking about the fundamental 
nature of the economic, social and environmental model and how it can be 
revitalised and preserved. 
Europe's leaders must explain these fundamental choices to their 
citizens and sketch out a positive way forward. Without such an open 
debate around Europe’s future, we will face growing imbalances and 
economic stagnation. The technical resolution of the euro crisis and even 
the challenge of current youth unemployment are only elements of this 
wider question. The future of the EU's economic, social and environmental 
model should take central stage in the current debate. 
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